MESSAGE AS MEDIUM IN SIERRA LEONE
Diane Marie Amann"
We attacked everybody.
We feared nobody.
We were very bold.
Everybody is knowing our tempers.

This virtual haiku of war comes from a fellow named Josep Sonah, whom
a Boston Globe report described as a nineteen-year-old veteran of the Sierra
Leone civil war.' Sonah's four statements reflect the reasons that the nearly
decade-old war in Sierra Leone has become notorious among armed conflicts.
We attacked everybody: The campaign, particularly that of the
Revolutionary United Front (RUF), the most significant of several rebel groups,
was a campaign of terror against civilians. It included arson, mutilation, and
summary executions. An estimated 20,000 persons were abducted, and many
have never been returned to their homes. Some were impressed into labor,
others used as human shields. There were systematic rapes, numbering in the
thousands, of girls as young as five, women as old as seventy-five. The
displacement of a million people, one-quarter of the country's population. And
the hallmark of this conflict, the chopping off of the hands of those said to have
cast votes for President Ahmed Tejan Kabbah in 1996.2
We were very bold: Sierra Leone is known for the use of child soldiers,
many of whom also were child victims. Estimates of the number of child
soldiers range between 5,000 and 10,000. One-tenth of the rebels who waged
a devastating assault on Sierra Leone's capital, Freetown, in January 1999 are
believed to have been children. Children were recruited by both sides of the
conflict, by pro-government militias and by rebels. At nineteen, Josep Sonah
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was an old soldier. Children as young as seven served in combat. Some came
to fight out of desperation or disaffection, but remained because of terror and
drugging. Others were kidnapped and forced into service. Many had no choice
but to stay because they had RUF tattoos, and their families would not take
them back.3
Everybody is knowing our tempers: Sierra Leone is also unsettling in that
there appears to be little explanation for the longevity and brutality of the war.
The conflict appears to have no source in, for instance, ethnic or religious
division. The RUF and other rebel groups lack both ideology and popular
support. They simply exploit alienation among young people, and then enforce
continued service through intimidation. Their motivations appear to be to
continue to profit from illegal diamond trading, and to continue to experience
the joy of doing evil.'
We feared nobody: Sierra Leone is notorious for giving amnesty to the
people who did these things. Amnesty was granted not once, but twice: first in
1996, in talks at Abidjan, C6te d'Ivoire, and again in 1999, at Lom6, Togo.5
Recently I have been studying expressive theories of law, and I find them
very helpful in considering events in Sierra Leone. Expressive theories look not
so much at whether a law deters or whether a law punishes, but at the message
we get from a law. The message understood, rather than the message intended,
is critical. Expressivism tells us that a harmful message in itself causes harm;
therefore, when we evaluate whether an action done was good or bad, we should
look at the message that the action was understood to convey. 6 I am going to
do that now, looking first at the Lomd Agreement and then at the post-Lom6
proposal for a Special Court for Sierra Leone.
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Preceding the Lomd Agreement were eight years of civil war, peppered
with coups d'dtat. At one point, in March 1996, Sierra Leoneans chose Kabbah,
a lawyer and former United Nations Development Program official, to be the
first democratically elected President in thirty years. Kabbah immediately
negotiated a ceasefire with Foday Saybana Sankoh, the leader of the RUF. On
November 30, 1996, the two signed a peace agreement, known as the Abidjan
Accord.7
The Abidjan Accord promised an end to the fighting, followed by
disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of combatants into Sierra
Leonean society. Numerous agencies, among them a Demobilization and
Resettlement Committee, a Socio-Economic Forum, and a National
Commission on Human Rights, were to be established to coordinate
reconstruction. Political prisoners and prisoners of war were to be released.
The RUF was to begin functioning as a legitimate political movement, and all
its soldiers were to enjoy amnesty:
To consolidate the peace and promote the cause of national
reconciliation, the Government of Sierra Leone shall ensure that no
official or judicial action is taken against any member of the RUF/SL
in respect of anything done by them in pursuit of their objectives as
members of that organization up to the time of the signing of this
Agreement.8
The RUF failed to meet disarmament deadlines, and the Abidjan Accord soon
foundered. Low-ranking members of the military staged a coup in May 1997.
Nigerian-led troops, organized under the auspices of the Economic Community
of Western African States (ECOWAS), deposed that junta in February 1998.
President Kabbah, who had been in exile in neighboring Guinea, resumed
power.9
In January 1999, the RUF waged a destructive attack on Freetown that
resulted in 6,500 dead, thousands kidnapped or maimed, and tens or hundreds
of thousands left homeless. ECOWAS troops again drove the rebels back.
Eventually Sankoh, a prisoner condemned to death for treason against Sierra
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Leone, was brought to Lomd, where he and the government again signed a
ceasefire in May 1999. Peace talks continued there, culminating six weeks later
in the Lom6 Agreement. 0
In many respects the Lomd Agreement resembled the Abidjan Accord. It
too promised disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration, and included
speedy timetables for this process. It included even more sweeping plans for
reconstruction, among them victims' and refugees' programs, educational
institutions, a Human Rights Commission, a Truth and Reconciliation
Commission, a National Election Commission, and a Constitutional Review
Committee. It also talked about transforming the RUF from a political
movement into a political party.
It spoke as well about amnesty. Again, unnamed combatants and
collaborators received pardons for their pre-Lomd actions. Then the Lom6
Agreement took a remarkable turn, granting the following, by name, to RUF
leader Sankoh: "In order to bring lasting peace to Sierra Leone, the
Government of Sierra Leone shall take appropriate legal steps to grant Corporal
Foday Sankoh absolute and free pardon.""
The Lomd Agreement did not just free Sankoh from liability. It rewarded
him, appointing Sankoh, by name, chairman of the new Commission for
Management of Strategic Resources, National Reconstruction and Development.
This reputed trafficker in diamonds, Sierra Leone's main source of wealth, was
to oversee the entire industry. Sankoh also was accorded the status of Vice
President of Sierra Leone, answerable only to the President.
United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan lauded it as "a great step
forward for Sierra Leone.' ' 12 He admitted that the Lom6 pardons were "difficult
to reconcile with the goal of ending the culture of impunity," but suggested that
he had alleviated that problem by addition of what United Nations officials have
variously termed a "proviso," "statement," or "reservation."' 3 I must mention
that although I am certain this addition exists, I have not been able to find it
attached to printed or on-line versions of the Lomd Agreement. The only
evidence I can find is in press reports or in United Nations documents, such as
the following passage, in which Annan reported to the United Nations Security
Council that he had instructed his "Special Representative to enter a reservation
when he signed explicitly stating that, for the United Nations, the amnesty
10.
On these events, see Sierra Leone Country Report, supra note 2, at intro. For specific peace
accord provisions discussed, see Lom Agreement, supra note 5.
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cannot cover international crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, war
crimes and other serious violations of international humanitarian law."' 4 Thus,
Annan indicated that there was an international way out of the agreement even
as he expressed a preference first to let Sierra Leone try to effect the amnesty.
United States officials maintained that the pardons of Sankoh and others
were essential to the deal, though several of the United States State Department
officials most concerned with human rights and humanitarian issues reportedly
opposed giving Sankoh a government post.
The amnesty outraged
nongovernmental organizations; others, however, faulted opponents for holding
Western, privileged viewpoints not suited to the needs of Sierra Leone. 5
Among many people within Sierra Leone, there was resignation."6 An
example is the following quote from sixty-eight-year-old Johnny Crowther. He
had spent half his life savings to build a cement-block house; rebels destroyed
it during the January 1999 attack on Freetown. Eight months later a New York
Times reporter found Crowther breaking what was left of his house into stones
that he could sell. Asked about the amnesty, Crowther said: "We just have to
forget, really, we just have to forget. Nothing else. I have no power. Our
leaders say we must forget. Am I going to refuse our leaders? We just have to
unite together and build the country back up together. Finished, finished, that
is all."' 7
What was the message of Lom6? There was an ostensible message of
reconciliation - admirable expressions, both in the preamble and in the
provisions of the Lom6 Agreement, of desires to move forward, to reconcile,
rebuild, reintegrate. That message, however, was supplanted by the message
that the amnesty provision conveyed. That provision contained a specific and,
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as far as I can tell, unique grant of pardon to a named individual, Foday Sankoh.
That individual was suspected of the most heinous crimes, of forcing others to
commit unspeakable acts. He had flouted an earlier promise to disarm in
exchange for amnesty. To pardon Sankoh, in that particular context, told the
world that, at least in Sierra-Leone, all talk of the new era of accountability was
just that, just talk. That atrocities will not be punished. That perhaps, if they are
effective enough, atrocities may even be rewarded. The subtextual message
was, the West does not really care, and does not have the political will to do
what really needs to be done in Sierra Leone.
Foday Sankoh, at least, got those messages. With regard to disarmament,
he stalled, he objected, he dissembled, much as after the signing of the Abidjan
Accord. When United States Secretary of State Madeleine Albright came to
Freetown to see him, he showed up hours late for the meeting. 8 He made harsh
public statements regarding the post-Lomd process; in dealings with Annan,
however, Sankoh reaffirmed his support for the peace process. 9 Attacks on
civilians resumed in October 1999, just a few months after Lomd, and almost
as soon as Sankoh returned to Freetown. ' By May 2000, as we all know,
everything fell apart. Five hundred United Nations peacekeepers were seized
by the RUF. Sankoh was arrested; nonetheless, peacekeepers remained in RUF
custody for several months before they were released, sometimes by negotiated
agreements and sometimes by commando operations. 2' Disarmament "came to
a standstill," Annan reported in mid-2000, and "the situation in Sierra Leone
remained tense and volatile under conditions that resemble civil war." 22
The international community now has a chance to do better. There is a
proposal for a Special Court for Sierra Leone. In June 2000, Sierra Leone wrote
Secretary-General Annan a letter asking for such a court.23 Two months later,
a Security Council resolution instructed the Secretary-General to negotiate an
agreement establishing a Special Court. On October 4, 2000, Annan submitted
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20.
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a proposed agreement and draft statute to the Security Council.'5 The proposal,
for a hybrid court that would comprise both international and Sierra Leonean
judges and would apply both international and Sierra Leonean law, is now under
consideration.
The contents of the draft statute address the four notorious features of the
Sierra Leone civil war that I mentioned at the outset. Respecting the campaign
of terror against civilians, the statute would set up a unit to address the needs of
victims and witnesses. It would require the court to balance a defendant's fairtrial rights against the needs for protection of victims and witnesses. It calls for
judges, investigators, and other staff who are trained in issues related to juvenile
justice and sexual violence. It includes three articles that would permit
prosecution for international crimes; specifically, Article 2 relating to crimes
against humanity; Article 3 relating to violations of the law of internal armed
conflict; and Article 4 relating to other serious violations of international
humanitarian law. With regard to the violence that women suffered during the
conflict, two of the international articles specifically allow prosecution for rape,
sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, and all other sexual
violence. Furthermore, Article 5, which covers Sierra Leonean law, permits
prosecution for certain abuses and kidnappings of girls.
With regard to the phenomenon of child soldiers and child victims, the
statute has two approaches. First of all, it permits prosecution not only for
abuse of girls, as mentioned above, but also for conscription of children under
fifteen for use in combat. Second, and most notably, the statute provides for a
Juvenile Chamber to prosecute child soldiers. This decision posed a "moral
dilemma," according to the Secretary-General's report, between the desire of the
people of Sierra Leone to call war criminals to account regardless of age and the
concern of human rights organizations that prosecution would undercut
rehabilitation.2 Annan said that the proposed statutory language aimed to
balance these concerns, should the Council, "weighing in the moral-education
message to the present and next generation of children in Sierra Leone, 27
decide to pursue prosecution. It is contemplated that the cases of defendants
who were between fifteen and eighteen when the alleged crimes occurred might
be referred to the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission, when it
begins operation. Annan's draft leaves that decision, however, to the discretion
of the prosecutor. Those cases referred to the Special Court might be conducted
25.
See Report of the Secretary-General on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone,
U.N. SCOR, 52d Sess., U.N. Doc. S/2000/915 (2000) [hereinafter Secretary-General's Special Court Report].
The proposed Agreement between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on the
Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, as well as the draft Statute of the Special Court for Sierra
Leone [hereinafter Special Court Statute], are attached to this report.
26.
Secretary-General's Special Court Report. supra note 25, para. 32, at 7.
27.
Id. para. 38, 8.
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in camera, in anonymous proceedings. A finding of guilt would result in a
"disposition" entailing no prison time, but rather orders to participate in
community service, counseling, schooling and vocational training, or
disarmament and reintegration programs. 2s
Such rehabilitative options begin to address the third feature of the Sierra
Leone conflict; that is, the disaffection and despair that contributed, at least at
the beginning, to the war.
Finally, respecting the fourth feature, amnesty, the Special Court statute
minces no words. It states: "An amnesty granted to any person falling within
the jurisdiction of the Special Court in respect of the crimes referred to in
Articles 2 to 4 of the present Statute shall not be a bar to prosecution." 29 It says,
simply, that the amnesty does not apply. It also incorporates a new message
about accountability. The clock for prosecution starts on November 30, 1996,
the date of the Abidjan Accord. The statute contains no finishing date for the
court, as is the case with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia.' This indicates that the Special Court is to keep watch over those
who should commit crimes within its jurisdiction in the future.
The message of the draft statute for the Special Court, then, is far stronger
than that of the Lomd Agreement. It promises accountability. It allows
flexibility to accommodate some of the features characteristic of the Sierra
Leone conflict.
It remains to be seen if the Special Court will be established. The initial
Security Council resolution suggested funding by voluntary contributions. 3
The Secretary-General's report questions the adequacy of this method, and
estimates that the court will cost twenty-two million dollars to operate the first
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Following the presentation of this paper, the United Nations Security Council omitted detailed
discussion of a Juvenile Chamber from the draft statute. See Letter dated December 22, 2000 from the
President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary General, U.N. Doc. S/2000/1234 (2000). Annan
acceded in large part, but called for reinstatement of the specific provision regarding disposition. See Letter
dated January 12, 2001 from the Secretary General addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N.
SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/2001/40 (2001). For a critique of the Juvenile Chamber proposal, see Diane Marie
Amann, Calling Children to Account: The Proposal for a Juvenile Chamber in the Special Court for Sierra

Leone, in PEPPERDINE L REv. (forthcoming 2001).
29.
Special Court Statute, supra note 25, at art. 10.
30.
Compare Special Court Statute, supra note 25, at art. Iwith Statute of the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, arts. 1, 8, S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., Annex,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993), reprinted in 32 1.L.M. 1159,1192, 1194 (1993). In contrast, the statute for the

Rwanda Tribunal contains both start and finish dates for temporaljurisdiction. See Statute of the International
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SIRES/955 (1994). reprinted in 33 I.LM. 1598, 1602, 1605 (1994).
31.
See Resolution 1315, supra note 13, para. 8.
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year. 32 That is an extremely conservative number, less than a quarter of this
year's budget for either of the ad hoc tribunals.3 3
Despite financial and other obstacles, the Special Court ought to be
attempted. I mentioned at the beginning that one of the notorious features of the
Sierra Leone conflict was amputation, at first of the hands those who had dared
to vote. The practice was not unique to this conflict. Belgian colonizers had
chopped off the hands of Congolese who resisted harsh conditions at the rubber
plantations. 34 The perpetrators of those atrocities never were punished. A
century later, Foday Sankoh's RUF borrowed that tactic of dominance, infused
it with new meaning, and used it for a new round of terror. Punishing those
responsible for atrocities in Sierra Leone, by conveying a concrete message of
accountability, may begin to break that cycle of violence.

32.
See Secretary-General's Special Court Report, supra note 25, at paras. 57-63, 68-72.
33.
A December 1999 report stated that the United Nations General Assembly had "decided to
appropriate some $106.15 million gross for the former Yugoslavia Tribunal and $86.15 million gross for the
Rwanda Tribunal" for this year. UN: General Assembly Adopts 2000-2001 Programme Budget of Some
$2.536 Billion as It Concludes Work, M2 PREsswiRE, Dec. 24, 1999, available at 1999 WL 24375551.
Subsequent references to the actual budgets were somewhat lower: about $96 million for ICTY and about
$80 million for ICTR. See ICTY President Wants Faster Processingof War Criminals,More Expeditious
Trials, WORLDS NEWS CONNETtON, June 21, 2000, availableat 2000 WL 22916078; Sylvia de Bertodano,
Rwanda's Long Waitfor Justice, TIMES (London), Aug. 22, 2000, at LAW4.
34.
See ADAM HOCHSCHILD, KING LEOPOLD'S GHOST 164-66 (1998) (describing practice, so widely
reported "that people overseas began to associate the Congo with severed hands"); BARBARA KINGSOLVER,
THE PoisoNwooD BIBLE 144, 432 (1998) (referring to this practice, and to "the whacked-off ghost hands of
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